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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Manson v. Braithwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
In Manson v. Braithwaite,1 the United States
Supreme Court set down further guidelines
concerning the admissibility of suggestive pre-
trial identification testimony. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that reliabil-
ity governs the admission of such testimony
and rejected a per se exclusionary rule.
Manson was the latest in a line of cases con-
cerning pretrial identification guidelines. This
line of cases began with the Wade trilogy2 de-
cided by the Court a decade ago. In United
States v. Wade, 3 the Court held that the sixth
amendment guaranteed the right to counsel at
a pre-trial lineup. The Court reasoned that the
great possibility of unfairness arising from
lineup procedures and the inability of the ac-
cused to reconstruct the events and obtain a
full hearing on the identification issue made
such confrontations a "critical" prosecutive
stage. Consequently, the absence of counsel
might deprive the accused of a fair trial. The
Court said that any in-court identification by a
witness who had taken part in such a lineup
would be admitted only if the government
could establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the testimony was based on obser-
vations independent of the lineup.4 The Court
97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
2 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
3 388 U.S. 218 (1967). This case involved a suspect
who was forced to participate in a lineup and repeat
words allegedly spoken by the criminal, without the
advice or assistance of counsel. The witness made an
in-court identification of the accused and on cross-
examination mentioned the lineup.
4 Application of this test in the present context
requires consideration of various factors; for
example, the prior opportunity to observe the
alleged criminal act, the existence of any dis-
crepancy between any pre-lineup description
and the defendant's actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person,
the identification by picture of the defendant
prior to the lineup, failure to identify the de-
fendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of
time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.
Id. at 241.
said that where the admissibility of evidence of
the lineup identification itself was not involved,
a per se exclusionary rule was unjustified. 5
The issue of admissibility of testimony con-
cerning the identification itself was determined
in Gilbert v. California.6 The Court there held,
laying down a per se exclusionary rule, that
such testimony could not be admitted even if
the government could show an independent
source. 7 The Court felt that the admission of
such testimony would be an exploitation of the
primary illegality-the denial of counsel at the
lineup.S
In the third case of the Wade trilogy, Stovall
v. Denno,a the Court ruled that Wade and Gilbert
applied prospectively only, and they established
a basis to attack an identification procedure
independent of the sixth amendment right to
counsel. The Court said that an identification
procedure may be so unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identifi-
cation that the accused is denied due process
of law.io Such claims must be evaluated by the
"totality of the circumstances."'h" In Stovall, the
5 Id. at 240.
6 388 U.S. 263 (1967). This companion case to
Wade was quite similar. Prior to advice of counsel,
the suspect in an armed robbery and murder case
was placed in a lineup and identified by various
witnesses. The witnesses later made in-court identifi-
cations, and some also testified as to the prior lineup.
7 "Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testi-
mony can be an effective sanction to assure that law
enforcement authorities will respect the accused's
constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at
the critical lineup." Id. at 273.
1 Id. at 272-73.
9 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall the suspect in a
murder case was brought to the hospital room of the
victim's widow, who was also assaulted by the mur-
derer. The suspect was the only black in the room
and was handcuffed to two white detectives. The
widow was in critical condition, and the police were
afraid she might die before a more conventional
procedure could be arranged. The witness testified
to this showup at the trial.
'0 Id. at 302. The Court cited no precedent for this
due process claim except one court of appeals case,
Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
" 388 U.S. at 302.
Vol. 68, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Court found that the circumstances justified
the procedure used.
12
The next identification procedure case de-
cided by the Supreme Court based on a due
process claim was Simmons v. United States.' 3 In
that case, the Court dealt with the admissibility
of an in-court identification after an allegedly
suggestive photographic identification. The
Court held that such identifications were to be
excluded only if the photographic identifica-
tion procedure was so "impermissibly sugges-
tive as to give rise to a very substantial like-
lihood of irreparable misidentification."' 4 In
determining whether to allow the in-court iden-
tification, the Court looked at factors similar to
the Wade independent source test." The Court
concluded that although the procedure used
may have fallen short of the ideal, there was
no reason to doubt the reliability of the in-
court identifications. 6
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court
which questioned identification procedures on
due process grounds relied on either Stovall,
which considered the justification and necessity
for the procedures used, or Simmons, which
considered the reliability of the identifications.
In Foster v. California,17 the Court apparently
followed Stovall and focused on the identifica-
tion procedures used rather than the witness'
reliability.' It denied the admission of testi-
12 Id. The Court said that the witness was the only
person who could exonerate the suspect, and that
the suspect had to be viewed by her as soon as
possible due to her serious condition.
13 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Simmons involved the armed
robbery of a federally insured savings and loan
association. In the search for the criminals, FBI
agents showed pictures of the petitioners to witnesses
of the crime. These witnesses later made in-court
identifications of the petitioners.
14 Id. at 384.
" See note 4 supra. The robbery took place during
the day under good lighting conditions, and the
witnesses clearly viewed the criminals. The photo-
graphic identification was held the next day, and the
witnesses were certain in their identifications.
16 390 U.S. at 385-86.
1 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
18 There also existed serious doubts as to the wit-
ness' reliability. After a lineup where the defendant
was six inches taller than the other two participants,
the witness could only say that he "thought" the
defendant might be the criminal. The police then
arranged a one-on-one confrontation, after which
the witness' identification was still -tentative. Only
after a second lineup, in which the defendant was
the only repeat from the first, did the witness posi-
tively identify the defendant as the robber. Id. at
441-42.
mony concerning a pre-trial lineup. In Coleman
v. Alabama,'9 the Court allowed an in-court
identification by the victim of an assault because
it felt the identification was reliable, looking at
the factors enumerated in Simmons.'"
At this stage, the pattern that seemed to be
emerging was two-pronged-if an unnecessar-
ily suggestive procedure was employed, testi-
mony concerning the confrontation itself must
be excluded as in Stovall, but an in-court iden-
tification following an unnecessarily suggestive
procedure would be admissible if it was deter-
mined to be reliable as in Simmons. This pattern
is quite similar to the Wade-Gilbert rules con-
cerning a lineup conducted in the absence of
counsel. Most lower courts followed this pat-
tern.21
The Supreme Court undermined this pat-
tern, though, in Neil v. Biggers.22 The Court
used the Simmons test to consider the admissi-
bility of testimony concerning a pre-trial
showup, apparently shattering the distinction
between Simmons and Stovall.2 The Court said
that the primary evil to be avoided was substan-
tial likelihood of misidentification, and that the
standard established in Simmons for determin-
ing admissibility of in-court identifications
would serve equally well in determining the
admissibility of testimony concerning the out-
of-court identification itself.'
4
19 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
20 The Court looked at the opportunity to view the
criminals at the time of the assault, the witness' prior
description and the witness' certainty at the time of
the identification. Id. at 4-6.
21 See Rudd v. Florida, 477 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1973); Workman v. Cardwell, 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.
1972); United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Fowler, 439 F.2d 133 (9th
Cir. 1971); and Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d
1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Some cases though, did not
draw such a sharp distinction between the Stovall
and Simmons tests. See United States ex rel. Gonzales
v. Zelker, 477 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1970);
and United States ex rel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406
F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969).
22 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Biggers involved a defendant
who was convicted of rape. The only testimony
linking him to the crime was the victim's identifica-
tion. The victim made an in-court identification and
also testified as to a one-man showup conducted
prior to trial at the police station.
"The Court looked at the lighting at the scene of
the crime, the length of time the victim was in the
rapist's presence, and the fact that she had not
previously identified anyone in various other lineups.
Id. at 200-01.
24 Id. at 198.
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However, Biggers dealt with a pre-Stovall con-
frontation, and the Court used language which
intimated that it might apply a different rule
to post-Stovall situations.2 The Court said that
the purpose of a strict exclusionary rule would
be to deter police from using a less reliable
procedure when a more reliable one was avail-
able. Such a rule was deemed inappropriate in
Biggers since the confrontation took place prior
to Stovall where the Court first denounced such
procedures." This language left open the
standard applicable to confrontations which
took place after the Stovall decision. The Court
could apply a strict exclusionary rule similar to
Wade-Gilbert, disallowing all testimony concern-
ing an unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial identi-
fication procedure or could treat such testi-
mony the same as an in-court identification,
with reliability governing admissibility.
The courts of appeals pursued divergent
paths. The Seventh Circuit adopted reliability
as the determining factor.2 7 In United States ex
rel. Kirby v. Sturges,28 the court specifically faced
the question whether Biggers was applicable to
post- as well as pre-Stovall confrontations. The
court, speaking through Judge (now Justice)
Stevens, rejected the per se exclusionary rule.
The court said that a suggestive lineup was not
inherently unconstitutional and that the de-
fendant was denied due process only by the
admission of unreliable testimony.2 9 Thus, if
the identification is reliable, no matter how
suggestive the procedure employed, there is
no constitutional infirmity in its admission.
The Second Circuit was the only other court
2' Such a [strict exclusionary] rule would have
no place in the present case, since both the
confrontation and the trial preceded Stovall v.
Denno, supra, when we first gave notice that the
suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was
anything other than a matter to be argued to
the jury.
Id. at 199.26 Id.
27 United States v. Kimbrough, 528 F.2d 1242 (7th
Cir. 1976); Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d
397 (7th Cir. 1975); and United States ex rel. Pierce v.
Cannon, 508 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1974).
28 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975). The Kirby case
involved the same defendant who had previously
appealed to the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972), in which the Court refused to
extend the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel to a pre-
indictment lineup. The defendant then sought ha-
beas corpus on Stovall- due process grounds.
29 510 F.2d at 406.
of appeals to specifically address the question.30
In Braithwaite v. Manson,"i the court settled on
the per se exclusionary rule.32 It considered
the deterrence of questionable police tactics of
primary importance. The court followed the
earlier dichotomy between in-court identifica-
tions and testimony concerning out-of-court
identifications and held that Biggers changed
the rule only with respect to pre-Stovall con-
frontations.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Manson to mend this growing rift among the
circuits.u Braithwaite was convicted of the pos-
session and sale of heroin. Glover, an under-
cover narcotics agent to whom Braithwaite al-
legedly sold the heroin, provided key evidence
at the trial. He identified Braithwaite in court
and also testified to a photographic identifica-
tion of the accused two days after the sale.
The purchase took place just prior to sunset
in a third floor hallway illuminated by natural
light. 34 The transaction took approximately two
minutes, during which time Glover clearly
viewed the seller. Immediately after the sale,
Glover described the seller to D'Onofrio, a
police officer, who suspected the identity of
the seller. D'Onofrio obtained a photograph of
Braithwaite from police files and left it in
Glover's office. Two days later, Glover saw the
picture and immediately recognized the man
in the picture as the seller.
The defense did not object to Glover's testi-
30 Other circuits seem to have leaned one way or
the other, though not specifically answering the ques-
tion. The First and Eighth Circuits seem to favor the
reliability test. United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030
(8th Cir. 1976); Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798 (lst
Cir. 1975); Souza v. Howard, 488 F.2d 462 (1st Cir.
1973). The Fourth and Sixth Circuits, though, seem
to favor a per se exclusionary rule. Webb v. Havener,
549 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Coiner, 473
F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973). But see United States v.
Scott, 518 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1975); Stanley v. Cox,
486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1973).
31 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975).
32 Evidence of an identification unnecessarily
obtained by impermissibly suggestive means
must be excluded under Stovall .... No rules
less stringent than these can force police admin-
istrators and prosecutors to adopt procedures
that will give fair assurance against the awful
risks of misidentification.
Id. at 371.
3 425 U.S. 957 (1976).
4 The purchase was intended to be made from
another drug dealer, but Glover apparently went to
the wrong apartment where he met Braithwaite in-
stead. 97 S. Ct. at 2245.
(Vol. 68
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mony at trial and a jury found Briathwaite
guilty on two counts. The Connecticut Su-
preme Court denied appeal35 and Braithwaite
petitioned for habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut. The district court, in an unpublished
opinion, dismissed the petition, but the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed with instruc-
tions for the writ to issue unless the state gave
notice of a desire to retry the respondent. 36
The court of appeals felt that evidence of the
photographic identification should have been
excluded, regardless of reliability, because ex-
amination of a single photograph was unneces-
sary and suggestive.3 7 Additionally, the court
felt that Glover's testimony was unreliable. 38
The United States Supreme Court reviewed
its decisions up to Biggers and recognized the
unresolved issue. It said, "[t]he question before
us, then, is simply whether the Biggers analysis
applies to post-Stovall confrontations as well as
those pre-Stovall."39 The Court said that the
identification procedure used by the police was
suggestive because Glover saw only one photo-
graph, and it was unnecessary because no
emergency or exigent circumstances existed.40
The Court recognized the two possible ap-
t1 State v. Braithwaite, 164 Conn. 617, 325 A.2d
284 (1973).
The defendant claims that the court erred in
permitting officer Glover to make an in-court
identification of the defendant. The defendant
asserts that the court should have determined
whether evidence of Glover's observance of the
defendant's photograph shortly after the sale
was prejudicial before it allowed the in-court
identification of the defendant. There was no
objection or exception to the evidence when
offered and this claim first appears in the de-
fendant's brief. The defendant has not shown
that substantial injustice resulted from the ad-
mission of this evidence. Unless substantial in-justice is shown, a claim of error not made or
passed on by the trial court will not be consid-
ered on appeal. State v. Bausman, 162 Conn.
308, 315, 294 A.2d 312; State v. Fredericks, 154
Conn. 68, 72, 221 A.2d 585.
325 A.2d at 285.
36 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975).3 7 Id. at 366-67.
3 Id.
39 97 S. Ct. at 2249.
40 The per se approach demands the exclusion of
testimony concerning unnecessarily suggestive iden-
tifications. If a subsequent identification is deter-
mined to be reliable, testimony concerning it and
any in-court identification will be admitted. The
totality approach looks to see if the challenged iden-
proaches employed by the courts of appeals,
and it weighed the benefits of each in light of
what it deemed to be three relevant considera-
tions.
First, the Court reiterated Wade's concern
with the fallibility of eyewitness testimony.
41
The Court noted that a witness often must
testify about a brief encounter with a total
stranger under conditions of emergency or
emotional stress. This already somewhat unre-
liable testimony may be further weakened by
suggestive police procedures. The Court char-
acterized Wade and its companion cases as re-
flecting the concern that the jury not hear
eyewitness testimony unless it has certain as-
pects of reliability.42 It said that both the totality
of circumstances and per se approaches would
be responsive to that concern. 43 But the Court
concluded that the per se approach went too
far, since it automatically and peremptorily
excluded evidence from the ju'ry which may be
reliable and relevant.
44
Second, the Court cited the deterrence of
questionable police practices. The Court admit-
ted that the per se approach would have a
more significant deterrent effect, but said the
totality approach would also influence police
behavior.45 It felt that the totality approach
would have an effect because the police would
guard against unnecessarily suggestive proce-
dures for fear that the identifications may be
excluded as unreliable.46 Also, the police would
not use unnecessarily suggestive procedures
for fear that the jury would discount the weight
to be given the testimony and thereby decrease
the chances for a conviction.
47
Third, the Court viewed the effect of the
alternative approaches on the administration
of justice. Here, the Court felt that the per se
approach suffered serious drawbacks. 48 By
denying the trier of fact reliable evidence, the
tification is reliable and, if so, allows testimony con-
cerning it and any subsequent identifications. Id. at
2251 n.10.
41 388 U.S. at 228-29.
42 This analysis of Wade is not entirely correct in
that the Wade-Gilbert line of cases exclude testimony
concerning a lineup without regard to reliability if
the accused had been denied his right to counsel.
43 97 S. Ct. at 2252.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.47 Id. at 2252 n.12.
48 Id. at 2252.
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per se approach might result in the guilty going
free.49 In those cases where the admission of
identification evidence is error under the per
se approach but not under the totality ap-
proach-cases in which the identification is
reliable despite the unnecessarily suggestive
procedure used-reversal is a harsh measure. 0
The Court noted, as did the Seventh Circuit in
Kirby, that the suggestive identification itself
does not intrude upon any constitutionally pro-
tected right.5 It is the admission of unreliable
testimony which deprives the defendant of due
process.
The Court therefore concluded that the to-
tality approach was the preferable standard:
We therefore conclude that reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of
identification testimony for both pre- and post-
Stovall confrontations. The factors to be consid-
ered are set out in Biggers .... These include
the opportunity of the witness to view the crimi-
nal act at the time of the crime, the witness'
degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior
description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time
between the crime and the confrontation.
Against these factors is to be weighed the cor-
rupting effect of the suggestive identification
itself."
The Court applied these standards to Manson
and determined that Glover's identification of
Braithwaite was reliable, despite the suggestive
procedure employed.53
Justice Stevens, concurring, reaffirmed his
position in Kirby.54 He also noted that when
determining the reliability of a questioned
identification, other evidence of guilt should
not be considered. 55 Such evidence may be
properly considered only when determining
whether the admission of unreliable testimony
was harmless error.56
Justice Marshall filed a strong dissenting
19 This contrasts with Marshall's view that the total-
ity approach might result in the conviction of the
innocent, with the guilty remaining free. 97 S. Ct. at
2259 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50 97 S. Ct. at 2252.
" Id. at 2252 n.13.
52 Id. at 2253.
5Id. at 2253-54.
" 97 S. Ct. at 2254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"But see United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Gonzales v. Zelker,
477 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1973).
56 97 S. Ct. at 2255 n.*.
opinion in which Justice Brennan concurred.' 7
They believed the Court was dismantling the
protections against mistaken eyewitness identi-
fications erected a decade ago in the Wade
trilogy.' 8 Justice Marshall reviewed the series
of identification procedure cases dealing with
due process claims in terms of the dichotomy
between in-court and out-of-court identifica-
tions. Analogizing to Wade, Justice Marshall
said that Stovall required the exclusion of any
evidence concerning an unnecessarily sugges-
tive identification.' 9 He felt that the Stovall and
Simmons tests applied to two totally different
situations and that merging the two tests was
error .
60
Adopting the same analytic approach used
by the majority, Justice Marshall favored the
per se standard.6' Considering the deterrence
of questionable police conduct, he said that
there was "no doubt that the conduct would
quickly conform to the rule,' 6' if the per se
approach were adopted. Justice Marshall also
said that nothing since Wade had changed his
assessment of the miscarriages of justice caused
by mistaken eyewitness identifications. 63
And as to the effect on the administration of
justice, Justice Marshall again found the bal-
ance favored the per se rule. He said that such
testimony should be excluded precisely because
it is inherently unreliable and has no place in
the judicial process. This contrasts to other
exclusionary rules which prevent the jury from
hearing relevant and reliable evidence to dis-
courage unconstitutional practices, such as ille-
gal searches or the denial of counsel. 64 A per
se exclusionary rule would protect the integrity
of the truth-seeking function of the trial and
discourage the use of needlessly inaccurate and
ineffective investigatory procedures .65
Justice Marshall concluded that the totality
approach would allow seriously unreliable and
misleading evidence to be put before the jury,
as he felt was done in Manson. Even using the
totality approach, Justice Marshall would have
57 97 S. Ct. at 2255 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2256.60 Id. at 2257.61 Id. at 2258-60.
62 Id. at 2258.
63Id. at 2258-59.




granted the writ because he felt that Glover's
testimony was unreliable. Thus, he reached
the opposite conclusion on the same evidence
considered by the majority.66
The Supreme Court has taken the wiser path
in Manson. The basic difference between the
admissibility of testimony concerning an unnec-
essarily suggestive identification procedure and
evidence obtained in an illegal search or ille-
gally obtained confession is that the suggestive
procedure itself does not invade a constitution-
ally protected right. Only when unreliable tes-
timony is admitted is the accused denied due
process of law.67 Thus, testimony concerning a
pre-trial lineup conducted in the absence of
counsel is automatically excluded without re-
gard to reliability or the procedure used.6s
Testimony concerning a suggestive confronta-
tion conducted when there is no sixth amend-
ment right to counsel is excluded only if it is
unreliable. 69 '
Thus, the Wade-Gilbert rules protect the ac-
cused's right to counsel and the Stovall rules
protect the right to due process. If testimony is
reliable despite suggestive procedures, the ac-
cused's right to due process is not violated.
The dissent's solution, to conduct a subsequent
confrontation using fair procedures to promote
reliability7" seems cosmetic only. Once a witness
has chosen a suspect, he is not likely to change
his mind at a subsequent lineup.7 1 So the ad-
missibility will still turn on those factors of
reliability enumerated by the majority. 2
Id. at 2260-64.
67 97S. Ct. at 2252 n.13; 510 F.2d at 406.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
70 97 S. Ct. at 2259.
71 Moreover, "[i]t is a matter of common experi-
ence that, once a witness has picked out the
accused at a line-up, he is not likely to go back
on his word later on, so that in practice the
issue of identity may (in the absence of other
relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be
determined there and then, before the trial."
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229 (quoting
Williams & Hammelman, Identification Parades, Part
I., 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 479,482.
Regardless of how the initial misidentification
comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to
retain in his memory the image of the photo-
graph rather than of the person actually seen,
reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent
lineup or courtroom identification.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 383-84.
2 97 S. Ct. at 2259.
Manson v. Braithwaite is the culmination of
the Stovall line of cases. It completed the evo-
lution of what was once a question of fact for
the jury into a mixed question of law and fact.
Prior to Stovall, the issue of suggestive identifi-
cation procedure was a matter raised on cross-
examination and put before the jury as a ques-
tion of credibility. Stovall said that the issue
may be so clear-cut as to make the identification
unreliable as a matter of law.73 Now Manson
has made the principle uniform throughout
the courts and eliminates testimony only when
it is clearly unreliable, otherwise leaving it to
the jury to weigh and credit the evidence.
However, problems still remain. The weight
of evidence necessary to remove the issue from
the jury is of primary importance. This prob-
lem is illustrated by Manson, where the majority
and the dissent evaluated the same evidence by
the same standard and reached opposite con-
clusions. Another problem is the isolation of
evidence relevant to reliability from other evi-
dence of guilt. The dissent expressed this con-
cern, saying that a violation of due process
would now be judged by the probability of
guilt.74 Though evidence of guilt will not enter
the decision process as overtly as envisioned by
the dissent, it will be difficult to block it totally
from consideration. To view evidence of guilt
in a vacuum will be difficult.
These problems can be solved by the devel-
opment of identification procedures and guide-
lines by the local legislatures and police depart-
ments. Such legislation was envisioned by the
Court in the Wade and Gilbert decisions. 75 The
writing and enforcement of guidelines will help
7 The reliability of properly admitted eyewit-
ness identification, like the credibility of other
parts of the prosecution's case, is a matter for
the jury. But it is the teaching of Wade, Gilbert
and Stovall, supra, that in some cases the proce-
dures leading up to an eyewitness identification
may be so defective as to make the identification
constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law.
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440,442-43 n.2.
74 By relying on the probable accuracy of a
challenged identification, instead of the neces-
sity for its use, the Court seems to be ascertain-
ing whether the defendant was probably
guilty.... By importing the question of guilt
into the initial determination of whether there
was a constitutional violation, the apparent ef-
fect of the Court's decision is to undermine the
protection afforded by the Due Process Clause.
97 S. Ct. at 2260.
7' Legislative or other regulations, such as those
1977]
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eliminate unnecessarily suggestive identifica-
tion procedures and protect the rights of the
accused. Admittedly, the impetus for the adop-
tion of such guidelines has slackened somewhat
by the adoption of the totality, rather than the
of local police departments, which eliminate the
risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at
lineup proceedings and the impediments to
meaningful confrontation at trial may also re-
move the basis for regarding the stage as "criti-
cal." But neither Congress nor the federal au-
thorities have seen fit to provide a solution.
What we hold today "in no way creates a consti-
tutional straightjacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to
have this effect."
per se, approach. The totality approach, as the
majority noted, should have some effect and
should spur the local law enforcement agencies
to control their identification procedures. Until
that time, the burden will fall on the courts to
ensure that unreliable identification testimony
does not reach the jury.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 239.
In the absence of legislative regulations ade-
quate to avoid the hazards to a fair trial which
inhere in lineups as presently conducted, the
desirability of deterring the constitutionally ob-
jectionable practice must prevail over the unde-
sirability of excluding relevant evidence.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 273.
[Vol. 68
